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SUMMARY
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) are vulnerable systems, and attacks are currently being
carried out against them. Some of these attacks have never been seen before, and so the first
step in defending CPS is to understand what attackers are doing, and how they are doing it.
Traditionally, honeypots have been a tool used to gain this information, but honeypots
need to be convincing to fool attackers. For CPS, being convincing entails not only ad-
dressing networking concerns, but also modeling device actuation fingerprints and how the
attached process responds to actuations.
In order to create a convincing CPS honeypot, a framework was developed to address
the need to present convincing networking, device, and process fingerprints. Two proof of
concept systems were developed for this framework, and a set of proof of concept device




Since the early 1990s, the idea of entrapping and deceiving computer attackers in order to
study their behavior and misdirect them has been used with great success in the computer
security field. This practice, traditionally done through a deliberately unused computing
system configured to emulate critical resources, called a Honeypot, has revealed many dif-
ferent attacker strategies, allowed researchers to gather malware binaries, and kept more
critical computing resources safe. As networking evolved, many honeypots were linked to-
gether to form Honeynets, in order to emulate full deployed networks. As attackers learned
of honeypots, they improved their techniques to detect whether a resource is being faked,
and this is now the primary means of defeating honeynets. If an attacker can realize that
a resource is being faked, he can move on to more critical resources, or feed the defender
false information in turn.
As the Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) space grows and becomes increasingly net-
worked, attackers have been more interested in compromising the resources controlling
these CPS. Honeypots/Honeynets have been designed to emulate CPS specific components
in response. However, all existing CPS honeypots neglect certain aspects of these sys-
tems that can alert an attacker to the nature of the honeypot, namely the simulation of
the attached physical process and the physics of the devices that interact with the process.
Consequently, a new CPS specific Honeypot framework is proposed, called HoneyPhy: A
Physics-aware Honeypot Framework, that addresses these problems and aims to be easily
extensible to all cyber-physical systems.
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1.1 Primary Contributions and Thesis Organization
The primary contributions of this thesis are the following:
• An initial version of HoneyPhy is proposed, which details a general structure for a
CPS Honeypot to include process and device models
• A proof of concept is implemented for this initial version of HoneyPhy, modeling a
simple HVAC system
• An extended version of HoneyPhy is proposed, which details a specific structure for
HoneyPhy deployments, dynamic deployment, and log collection
• A proof of concept is implemented for this extended version of HoneyPhy, modeling
a simple water treatment system
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides background
and related work in assessing Cyber Physical System security and prior attacks, the field
of honeypots, and the development of CPS-targeted honeypots. Chapter 3 presents the
design of a CPS honeypot capable of modeling process and device behaviors. Chapter 4
presents the implementation of two proof of concepts, and the attendant implementation
of the varying process and device models. Finally, Chapter 5 presents the conclusion and
potential avenues for future work.
2
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Background: Cyber-Physical Systems & CPS Security
NIST defines a Cyber-Physical System, or CPS, as “co-engineered interacting networks
of physical and computational components” [1]. Traditionally, these systems were mostly
operated by engineers with a background in controls, and so most of the notions of “se-
curity” applied to these systems are defined in terms of operational security. An example
of this is the standardization of N-1 contingency analysis by the North American Energy
Reliability Corporation (NERC) [2]. As computational technology makes the controlling
of these systems easier, however, the increased networking that comes with it increases the
potential for insecurity.
The key component that differentiates CPS from traditional computer networks is the
attached physical components. These components and the actuation and sensation they are
capable of form an alternative means of flow for information between networked compo-
nents, albeit one that if misused can cause significant physical damage.
2.1.1 CPS-Targeted Attacks
Recently more work has been done investigating the cyber security of CPS. Much of this
work has been motivated by the increasing number of CPS-targeted attacks since the pub-
licization of Stuxnet. A set of recent attacks are discussed below.
Stuxnet
Stuxnet [3] is likely the most commonly known CPS-targeted attack. Stuxnet was first
noted in 2007, with a later version found in 2010, and was designed to delay or destroy
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Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities. It did this by infecting a variety of Siemens con-
trollers. When activated, Stuxnet blinded the human plant controllers by replaying previous
signals, and executed control actions that damaged equipment. In the early version, this
control action consisted of overpressurizing the uranium enrichment centrifuges, and in the
later version, this action consisted of altering the rotational speed of the centrifuge rotors.
Duqu
Duqu [4] was a piece of malware found in the wild, which presented similar fingerprints to
Stuxnet. Later analysis by Kaspersky [5] concluded its purpose to similarly be spying on
the Iranian nuclear program, although the malware itself did not appear to have the same
PLC-targeted approach.
Dragonfly/Havex
Dragonfly [6] is a group that has, since 2013, targeted organizations that deal in the energy
sector. The group uses a variety of techniques to compromise company machines. In
addition, the ICS software producers that supplied the companies were compromised, and
the updates provided by the software producers’ websites included malware.
Ukranian Electric Utility
Late December 2015, 3 Ukranian power distribution substations were taken offline by
attackers [7]. This attack resulted in 225,000 customers going without power for sev-
eral hours. The attack used several different methods, but involved developing malicious
firmware for serial to ethernet converters, hijacking SCADA clients and HMIs to send
commands to breakers, and executing DOS attacks to delay remediation efforts. Evidence
indicates the attacks to be highly targeted to the specific utility.
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2.1.2 Other Motivating Factors
Other work has highlighted the emerging vulnerability of CPS, as well as attacker interest
in them.
Shodan
The Shodan project [8] has gathered a large amount of publicity. It regularly scans a number
of ports on the entire IPv4 address space, and logs the banners returned from the relevant
services. Many of the ports included in its scans include protocols commonly used by CPS,
and consequently one of the major results of the project has been greater insight into the
sheer number of CPS devices that face the internet. A common justification for outdated
equipment and slow patch cycles in CPS equipment is the assumed ‘air gap’ between the
internet and production networks. Shodan acutely illustrates how often this assumption is
violated.
Probing Behavior
Recent work [9] examined the probing and discovery behavior directed towards commonly
used CPS protocols by monitoring unused IP space. The work monitors a number of ports
for unsolicited traffic and attempts to correlate separate events into orchestrated probing
campaigns. Their methodology identified 58 separate probing campaigns, 5 of which are
significantly larger, consisting of at least 50 probe sources. Some of the identified probing
campaigns originated from benign organizations, but others are inferred as being malicious.
2.2 Background: Honeypots
As stated previously, a honeypot is a computing system designed to be attacked. They have
a rich history, dating back to the first instance of using deception to waylay and attacker,
divine their intentions, and determine their origin [10].
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Traditionally, honeypots are broken into two orthogonal sets of broad classifications:
high and low interaction honeypots, and research and production honeypots.
2.2.1 Low Interaction
Low interaction honeypots work to accurately emulate a set of services and some system
behaviors. No effort is given to other services, and the emulated services might not im-
plement the services full feature set. Low interaction honeypots get their name from the
low level of interaction available between the attacker and the machine. Consequently, low
interaction honeypots can behave in unexpected fashions when they encounter unexpected
behavior. This unexpected behavior can also alert the attacker to the fact that the machine
he is interacting with is a honeypot, which will likely cause the attacker to either disconnect
or continue the interaction with the intent to mislead. Additionally, because attackers are
limited in how they can interact with the machine, the information that can be gained from
the honeypot is also limited. Both of these cases severely limit the usefulness of a low
interaction honeypot, and motivated the movement to high interaction honeypots in their
place. One very well-known example of a low interaction honeypot is HoneyD [11], which
can be configured to emulate a variety of different OS, offering a variety of services.
2.2.2 High Interaction
High interaction honeypots, in contrast, do not emulate. They are real resources, instru-
mented to log an attackers behavior, and are deployed to be unused for any other purpose.
This allows the attacker to interact with real operating systems and applications. Conse-
quently high-interaction honeypots offer great benefits in logging all of an attackers behav-
ior, but also expose great risk in allowing an attacker to potentially compromise these real
resources.
High Interaction honeypots have gained popularity since virtualization has become
more prevalent. Virtualized environments allow many victim machines to be hosted on
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the same physical resource, and the networking conditions to be tightly controlled.
2.2.3 Research
Research honeypots are deployed in order to gain an understanding of the motivations
and strategies of attackers. These will, in general, need to be more convincing, as these
honeypots need to convince an attacker to maintain access long enough to actually attack
the system.
2.2.4 Production
In contrast to research honeypots, production honeypots are deployed within production
networks. They primarily serve to notify the network owners of any unauthorized access,
which then serves as an early indication of potential compromise. No deep deception is
necessary, as any access to the honeypot at all provides value in giving advance warning of
an intrusion.
2.2.5 Honeypot Detection Techniques
Many honeypots, but primarily research honeypots, derive their value from how well they
convince an attacker of their authenticity. The more convincing a honeypot is, the more
likely an attacker is to interact for longer, and to carry out some interesting attack. Con-
sequently, as honeypots became more and more popular, a cat and mouse game emerged
between honeypot detection and deception techniques.
Ultimately, detection techniques differ between low-interaction and high-interaction
honeypots. Low-interaction honeypots commonly only implement some subset of the ser-
vices they expose, so detecting a low-interaction honeypot requires testing some corner
case of the emulated service, and examining the resulting behavior to see if it matches the
real service. An example of this is the detection of the Kippo SSH Honeypot through send-
ing 8 new-line characters and examining the differences between how Kippo responds and
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how a real SSH service responds [12]. High-interaction honeypots in contrast are often
revealed through more subtle fingerprints. An early high-interaction honeypot tool, called
Sebek [13], implemented a kernel-level module to capture keystrokes and other system
data. Subsequently, a method to detect and circumvent Sebek was published, called NoSE-
BrEaK [14], which detected the presence of the Sebek kernel module in several subtle
ways including analyzing how network interface statistics changed and analyzing system
call tables.
Ultimately, the requirement for modeling process and device behavior arises from these
more subtle methods of honeypot detection seen in high-interaction honeypot evasions.
These subtle detection techniques illustrate that attackers are capable of, and willing to, test
the machines they interact with in various ways. If an attacker is aware they are interacting
with a CPS, and are wary of the possibility of the system being a honeypot, it is possible for
them to compare the behavior of the system in relation to the attached process and devices
for inconsistencies. This creates a necessity for a convincing CPS honeypot to accurately
model these processes and devices.
2.3 Background: CPS Honeypots
Since 2004, a variety of CPS-targeted honeypots have been released and deployed. A listing
and analysis of modeling capabilities is provided below.
2.3.1 SCADA HoneyNet Project
The first low interaction CPS targeted honeypot was released in March, 2004 by Cisco Sys-
tems, and was called the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) HoneyNet
Project [15]. It leveraged HoneyD [11], Arpd, Snort, and Tripwire to emulate many hosts
on a network. Specifically, it aimed at emulating FTP, HTTP, Telnet, and Modbus for a
Schneider PLC, and FTP, HTTP, SNMP, and S7comm for a Siemens PLC. The honeypot
makes no attempt to simulate process behavior. The project is no longer maintained.
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2.3.2 Digital Bond’s Honeynet
Released shortly after, Digital Bonds Honeynet [16] has a similar goal of providing a low
interaction honeypot simulating a single Modicon Quantum PLC. The system can be con-
figured to either have a virtual machine as a target, with simulated applications and HoneyD
monitoring interactions, or be deployed as a high-interaction honeypot with a real device.
Both targets are set behind a Honeywall [17] designed to separate the target machine from
production networks and filter outgoing traffic.
2.3.3 Dynamic Honeyd System
A system was described in [18], which proposed using several tools to identify other hosts
residing in a network, and dynamically configuring and deploying instances of Honeyd.
The target environment was a small campus grid located in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and con-
tained many devices traditionally associated with CPS. Significant evaluation was done in
the network fingerprints presented by the Honeyd instances, but no mention is made of
emulating process or device behaviors.
2.3.4 Gaspot
Gaspot, presented at Blackhat 2015 [19], was based on research done at TrendMicro. Mo-
tivated by attacks observed on gas station control devices, the low interaction honeypot
simulates basic services provided by these devices, and logs all interactions. The honey-
pot is relatively simple, and responds to queries with randomized values within plausible
ranges. After deployment in a variety of countries, attacker interactions and origins were
analyzed.
2.3.5 Honeyd+
In [20], a Honeyd based high-interaction honeypot for a single proxied PLC is presented.
Specifically, the system aims to cheaply present many virtualized hosts, all of which are
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proxied to the same physical device. It was tested with two different physical PLCs, and
two different proxy devices. It is unspecified what other physical components the PLC
device is connected to.
2.3.6 Virtual ICS Honeypots-in-a-Box
A honeypot system was presented in [21], based on MiniCPS [22]. The MiniCPS frame-
work is capable of link shaping , as well as Software Defined Network emulation. Similarly
to this work, the system provides process and device simulation, but the device simulation
consists of emulating device services and logic, and does not extend to actuation finger-
prints.
2.3.7 Conpot
Conpot is an actively maintained low interactive server side Industrial Control Systems
honeypot designed to be easy to deploy, modify and extend [23]. While inherently extensi-
ble, Conpot is not aimed at modeling either processes or devices. System definition is done
through xml files, and protocol emulation is done using Python. Out of the box examples
simulate device memory, leveraging the Modbus tk library.
Conpot has been extended to imitate a smart meter in [24]. The imitation smart me-
ter presents Modbus, SNMP, and a static HTTP HMI. Because the honeypot is primarily
providing intelligence to a production system, the focus is on using any interaction as an
indication of compromise. Consequently, little work is done towards process or device
emulation.
Conpot has also been extended to simulate electrical grid components in the project
GridPot [25] GridPot leverages GridLAB-D to model an IEEE power distribution test case,
and this is used as a process model.
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2.3.8 CryPLH
CryPLH, the Crysys PLC Honeypot [26] is an actively developed low-interaction honeypot
designed to emulate a Siemens Simatic 300 PLC. It simulates the exposed HTTP, HTTPS,
SNMP, and Siemens SIMATIC STEP7 (carried out over the ISOTSAP protocol) config-
uration interfaces on a minimal Ubuntu Linux VM, and uses a central configuration file
to simplify and end users configuration. The HTTP/S and ISOTSAP interfaces both have
logins where no username/password combination will successfully log in, and the visible
web portal does not change to reflect the PLCs environment.
2.4 Why Existing CPS Honeypots Are Not Sufficient
In traditional network focused honeypots, as well as in existing CPS honeypots, the main
goal was to emulate the kinds of protocol quirks that fingerprinting utilities like Nmap and
p0f look for. However, CPS honeypots should provide auxiliary information arising from
the attached physical system. This auxiliary information is both the ability to compare the
moment to moment state of the CPS for consistency (i.e., leveraging the physics of the pro-
cess and sensors), as well as observing the individual connected devices for unreasonable
actuation fingerprints. If either the process physics or device actuation times are unrealistic,
an attacker can easily determine if they are in a honeypot.
A simple example can illustrate why process and device simulation are important to the
design of a CPS honeypot. A consumer home Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
(HVAC) system represents a familiar and intuitive CPS, where networked thermostats con-
trol physical devices like heaters, compressors, and fans. In reality, if a command is issued
by a thermostat to begin heating, a heater turns on. If temperatures are read in succession,
the home temperature can be seen to slowly rise in response. Imagine that an attacker is
interacting with a honeypot designed to emulate this system. First, the attacker turns on the
heater, and then he closely monitors the homes temperature sensor. If this honeypot makes
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Figure 2.1: Outcomes of an attacker interacting with different levels of simulation
no attempt to simulate the process it claims to control, and instead returns random responses
or does not respond to the heating, an attacker will see temperatures over time that do not
reflect the activation of the heater. Alternately, the temperature sensor could instantly show
the final temperature, which would completely neglect the physics of the system. In either
scenario, the attacker knows the system he is interacting with is either faulty, or does not
control the system it claims to. Accordingly, they are likely to not continue interacting with
the system, and the honeypot loses utility.
A similar example can illustrate the need to simulate the physical/mechanical finger-
print of a device (i.e., actuator). If the thermostat controls a heater through the use of a
mechanical relay, activation of the heater requires changing the state of that relay. This
state change requires some amount of time, determined by the electro-mechanical charac-
teristics of the relay [27]. In some devices, this delay can be on the order of milliseconds or
longer, and the distribution of this delay forms a fingerprint for a device. If, as is the case in
many other kinds of CPS, the thermostat is instrumented to confirm the state change, this
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delay is now exposed to the attacker. An attacker can look for this device delay, and use
it to test whether the system is a honeypot. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The left sce-
nario illustrates an attacker interacting with a real system, so all delays and responses result
from physical process and device behavior. The right scenario illustrates an attacker inter-
acting with a CPS honeypot that does not attempt to model process behaviors and device
delay, and the lack of this delay and deviations from expected process behavior will alert
the attacker to the honeypot. The middle scenario illustrates an attacker interacting with a
CPS honeypot that is capable of modeling both process behavior and device fingerprints.
Responses provided to the attacker are thus realistic, and the attacker proceeds to perform
observed malicious actions.
These scenarios present an actuation device whose fingerprint is a simple delay char-
acterized some distribution, but devices could conceivably have much more complicated
fingerprints. There exist mixing valves that receive an open/close set point from a PLC,
and can return a signal to the PLC showing the current state. The response of the device to
changing the set point can be used to fingerprint the device.
Table 2.1 shows the state of emulation provided by the previously noted CPS honeypots.
Most of them neglect modeling process behavior, and all neglect to model device actuation
times and fingerprints. In the table, the term proven either indicates an attacker was fooled
by the honeypot at this level in the honeypots history, or that the honeypot was tested by an
associated tool by the honeypots creator.
2.4.1 How Should a CPS Honeypot Fit Into Honeypot Classifications?
Pure high-interaction honeypots are fundamentally unsuited to CPS, because they rely on
either deploying another physical copy of the resource in question, or somehow virtualizing
it. Deploying a copy of an entire CPS with the express purpose of being compromised
exposes the same safety risks as the original system, and imposes large costs. A pure high
interaction honeypot can be deployed for a single component or small group of components
13
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within a CPS, but without the physical portion of the system to interact with, the usefulness
of these honeypots is limited.
One solution is to create a hybrid-interaction honeypot, where real devices (e.g., pro-
grammable logic controllers (PLCs), intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), and remote ter-
minal units (RTUs)) and interfaces interact with process and device simulations that can
effectively fully replicate the behavior of the CPS process. In some cases obtaining and
linking real devices might be impractical, however, such as if honeypot instances need to
be dynamically deployed. In these cases, support must be made available for virtualizing
real devices where possible, or creating device models emulating real functionality where
necessary.
For this thesis, obtaining real devices was impractical, so the implementations devel-
oped here are entirely low-interaction. This is a result of the device models used, however,




In order to address the limitations of current CPS honeypots, a new type of CPS honeypot is
proposed which can account for the physics of the process and devices to which computing
systems are attached. To begin with, an initial set of requirements are defined.
3.1 Initial Requirements
This new CPS honeypot should correctly model software and protocol fingerprints, as with
all other honeypots. Matching these fingerprints is well understood, and the goal of all
previous CPS honeypots. This interface layer of the honeypot could be either high or low
interaction, depending on access to equipment such as Human-Machine Interfaces (HMIs).
In addition to this, this CPS honeypot should correctly model the behavior of the physi-
cal system. This primarily ensures that physical parameters, when queried, behave in a way
consistent with attacker expectations. Without this, future attackers could conduct simple
tests to check the authenticity of the machine or machines they are interacting with. A CPS
process model will require simulation to model this behavior, as replicating the process
exposes real risks.
Finally, this honeypot should correctly model the fingerprints introduced by the con-
stituent devices within the CPS. These fingerprints could either originate from the opera-
tion of real devices used in the CPS honeypot, or be generated by modeling the devices.
Returning to the HVAC example, these fingerprints would originate from the time it takes
for the electromechanical relays to physically open or close, energizing or de-energizing
the fan, heater, or compressor to move the system to the desired state. Attackers measur-
ing the physical actuation time for these devices could detect a honeypot environment if
the measurements lay outside the known operation times for each device. These operation
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times can be modeled, and these models can be generated in one of two ways, white box
modeling or black box modeling.
Black box modeling is the method of generating a model for the behavior of the de-
vice based on physical access to it and a set of true measurements of its behavior. By
comparison, white box modeling requires no physical access to the device and involves
mathematical modeling of the device based on estimates of the device parameters and stan-
dard physical models. The primary advantage black box modeling holds over white box
modeling is that it results in the most accurate representation of the device behavior, since
it is based on empirical measurements. However, attackers will not always have physical
access to a target device type to make empirical measurements on to form the black box
model. In this scenario intelligent attackers can then resort to white box modeling to gen-
erate an estimate of the device behavior and still make educated guesses about whether
the device is a honeypot or a true target. Previous work [27] shows that not only is the
construction of these models feasible, the models are convincing.
Both these initial requirements and the extended requirements that follow are summa-
rized in Table 3.1.
3.2 HoneyPhy in the Abstract
In order to satisfy these requirements, an initial abstract framework was developed, which
here is referred to as HoneyPhy in the Abstract. This framework is composed of three
major components: the Internet Interface(s) Module, the Process Model(s) Module, and the
Device Model(s) Module. A framework overview can be seen in Figure 3.1. This abstract
framework was created in order to provide a means to identify the key components of a
process, identify how those components map to models, and provide a common language to
configure and interconnect those models. A proof of concept implementation is described
later.
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Figure 3.1: Abstract HoneyPhy Architecture
3.2.1 Internet Interface(s) Module
The Internet Interface Module exposes the declared interfaces at the declared addresses. It
maintains connections and multiplexes them to their destinations while ensuring outgoing
packets reflect the network fingerprint for each device, modifying them if necessary.
3.2.2 Process Model(s) Module
The Process Model exists to simulate the physical process in question. This is essentially
whatever is controlled by the devices, and examples include the flow of electricity through
the grid, the flow of water through pipes, and the way in which a space heats in an HVAC
system. It is interrogated and acted upon by the other devices modeling sensors and actu-
ators, and simulates the process in real time. The Process Model communicates with the
various Devices and Models over a separate databus. If desired, a secure Internet-facing in-
terface can be opened to remotely interact with the process model directly. Process Models
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could consist of LabView simulations, replays of empirically observed responses (as done
in our proof-of-concept presented later), or more traditional controls system models such
as a Linear Dynamical System or Auto-Regressive models [28, 29].
3.2.3 Device Model(s) Module
The Device Models encompass all devices found within a CPS, from PLCs to relays to
pumps. Individual device models likely map to individual, physically discrete devices.
Wherever they control actuators, device models are capable of changing a process vari-
able, and wherever they control sensors, device models are capable of querying a process
variable. Where device models simulate computing devices such as PLCs, the models
implement logic to simulate the programs those devices run. This can include interpreting
incoming queries and responding with the value they obtain by querying the process model,
or executing incoming commands by modifying the process model. Where Device Models
simulate mechanical devices such as relays or valves, the model implements the developed
fingerprint for that device in whatever way is necessary to accurately model the device’s
behavior. Device models can range from very simple low level black box timing models to
real devices, sufficiently instrumented to interact with the process model.
3.2.4 Inter-module Communication
While this abstract framework does not specify a required inter-module communication
method, it does specify where communication must be available. The Internet Interface
module must be able to route incoming/outgoing communications to all applicable devices,
and optionally expose the internet facing interface for the process model. Additionally, all
devices must be able to talk not only to each other, but also to the process model. This
necessitates a separate Process/Device databus.
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3.3 Extended Requirements
Once the initial abstract framework was developed, a more clear idea of the requirements
for a deployable version of HoneyPhy was obtained. Significant inspiration for these re-
quirements was derived from modern dynamic and distributed honeypot efforts such as [30,
31]. These requirements fall into several basic categories.
Both these extended requirements and the initial requirements they refine are summa-
rized in Table 3.1.
3.3.1 Support for Physical Devices
For the most realistic honeypots, device models would consist of the devices themselves,
sufficiently instrumented to interact with all other models. This would fully replicate all
device behavior such as potential exploits and network timings, and effectively create high-
interaction honeypots. However, the need to configure and manage physical devices ham-
pers the potential for automation deployment, as discussed in the next section.
3.3.2 Automated Deployment
It is common among more recent honeypot offerings to dynamically deploy a large number
of ‘sensors’ in a network [30, 18]. For implementations of HoneyPhy which are entirely
virtualized, there should be a mechanism to support this automated deployment of various
sensors. To that end, there should exist a central server that contains all the information
necessary to deploy a HoneyPhy instance. This central server should also be capable of
being a central repository for the log information generated by the various deployments.
As discussed in Chapter 4, in the proof of concept this takes the form of an HTTP server,
exposing a REST API.
For implementations of HoneyPhy which are not entirely virtualized, and instead con-
tain virtual models combined with physical components, this same central repository should
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be able to be run locally, and should still serve as a log collection mechanism.
As a consequence of the desire for dynamic deployability, it is necessary to separate
what is termed ‘template’ information from ‘deployment’ information. Template informa-
tion consists of the code that implements process and device models, as well as services
exposed to the internet. In comparison, Deployment information consists of the information
specific to an individual deployment, such as MAC addresses, IP addresses, and identifying
information found in devices.
3.3.3 Augmented Intelligence Extraction
Historically, honeypots have generated two classes of information based on whether they
are research or production honeypots. Research honeypots yield information related to at-
tacker methods and identities, whereas production honeypots primarily yield information
related to the presence of attackers. This information arises solely from the network inter-
actions observed.
With the addition of the ability for attackers to interact with processes and devices, it
becomes possible to label attackers in a more meaningful way in both scenarios.
Research Honeypots
For research honeypots, the addition of process models and behaviors allows investiga-
tions into not only how attackers take advantage of network vulnerabilities, but also how
attackers exploit those vulnerabilities to affect changes in process behaviors. Furthermore,
the ways in which attackers manipulate process models could give insights into attacker
motivations.
Production Honeypots
Similarly, for production honeypots, a reasonably simple implementation attached to a pro-
cess model could be used to not only give information on the presence of attackers, but
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also on the level of sophistication of those attackers. Previous work [32] has shown the
feasibility of classifying attacker sophistication based on observed exploits. For produc-
tion CPS, attacker familiarity with the production system and CPS in general is of similar
importance. Network and process logs can be analyzed to determine if an attacker is un-
aware of the CPS nature of the network, if an attacker is aware of the network’s nature but
unfamiliar with the devices deployed, or if an attacker is familiar with the deployed system
and their first action is to exploit and actuate a device.
Required Augmentation
In order to support providing this increased level of information in both a research and pro-
duction environment, it is necessary to keep a complete log of process behavior, device in-
teractions, and network communication across all devices. Additionally, safety constraints
for process behaviors should be noted, so that obviously dangerous behavior can be easily
identified.
All of these various logs should be collected and centrally located. In order to ease
post-processing and alert generation, all logs should be timestamped from a single source.
Optional Augmentations
This system could, in addition to the information described above, offer insight into how
attackers find vulnerable CPS. The system could check whether or not IPs exposed by the
deployment are listed in locations that commonly list vulnerable systems. Shodan [8] is a
public example, but other locations could also be used. Frequencies of attacker interactions
before and after discovery in the various locations could be compared.
Insights could also be derived concerning how attackers find exploits. CPS exploits,
as with traditional exploits, are commonly published. It is also common for these exploits
to be collected by a single organization. For CPS related vulnerabilities, this organization
is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s ICS-CERT [33]. Signatures of these pub-
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lished vulnerabilities could be derived and compared against intrusion actions. Frequency
of usage of the published vulnerabilities before and after publication could be compared.
This is obviously less effective for zero-day exploits, but long-term deployment and ac-
curate log-keeping could allow retroactively published vulnerability signatures to be com-
pared to previous intrusions.
For virtualized device models which present network services to be convincing, as many
published exploits will be emulated within the device models as possible. Previous hon-
eypots such as Nepenthes [34] and its’ successor Dionaea [35] are examples of previous
low-interaction honeypots that have emulated exploits.
Augmented Intelligence Example
An example illustrating the way in which this intelligence could be derived is shown in
Figure 3.2. Prior to an interaction, the deployment’s presence in vulnerable listings and
published vulnerabilities effecting the deployment’s devices are noted (0). At some point
before the intrusion, the attacker finds the vulnerable device and an exploit for that device
(1). The order in which the attacker finds this information is irrelevant. The attacker then
begins interacting with the vulnerable device, which appears in a realistic place but all
traffic is routed to wherever the hardware is physically located (2). All interactions are
logged, but if the attacker takes some action which actuates on or senses process state, the
relevant device models exchange the necessary communications, and process state changes
to reflect the actuation/sensation (3). When the interaction is finished, all logs are collected
centrally (4). These logs can be analyzed to determine what devices the attacker thinks they
are interacting with, as well as the attackers familiarity with the specific system (5).
3.3.4 Ease of Implementation
Even small scale CPS can be very complex, and include complex models. A major barrier
to deployment for a honeypot that requires complex system models is the amount of effort
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Figure 3.2: Additional Honeypot Intelligence Example
needed to implement those models, and integrate them into the honeypot. Similarly, a
primary identifier for honeypots like Conpot on systems like Shodan are default, unchanged
configuration parameters.
Any deployable HoneyPhy system should make it as easy as possible to integrate previ-
ously developed models and services. This could take a number of forms, but ultimately the
system should minimize the amount of code a user should have to write to implement their
desired system. Similarly, the system should also have as simple a configuration process as
possible to minimize the possibility of users leaving default parameters.
3.3.5 Realistic IP Address Placement
Finally, in order to appear convincing, the IP Addresses presented by the various devices
of a CPS must be realistic. In this context, ‘realistic’ corresponds to the IP addresses being
allocated to a single company that could believably control the modeled system and that
operates in an area corresponding to the geo-location obtainable for those IP addresses,
such as the information obtainable through Shodan [8]. In [36], a method is presented to
achieve this through wormholes.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Requirements For CPS Honeypot Design
Initial Requirements
Networking Fingerprints Honeypot should correctly model protocol fingerprints
Process Behavior Honeypot should correctly model process behavior
Device Fingerprints Honeypot should model device actuation fingerprints
Extended Requirements
Physical Device Support Design should allow for incorporation of actual devices




Design should allow collection of all information from the
deployment, including process and device logs
Ease of Implementation Process and Device models should be simple to integrate
with each other. External process models should be sup-
ported
Realistic IP Addresses IP Addresses should belong to the organization that owns
the modeled system
Ideally, realistic IP addresses would either be provided by a system owner for a deploy-
ment in a research setting, or naturally be available to the system owner in a production
setting. As the system implemented and presented here was not created with collaboration
with any system owner, obtaining realistic IP addresses was not possible.
3.4 Deployable HoneyPhy Structure
In order to satisfy these refined requirements, another iteration of the framework was cre-
ated. This updated framework is referred to as the Deployable HoneyPhy. An overview
of this system can be seen in Figure 3.3. Individual deployments resemble the abstract
framework, and device and process models map in the same way. This is shown in Figure
3.3 using models implemented in the abstract framework proof of concept, discussed in
Chapter 4. Similarly, there is an external network where devices expose services and an
internal network where devices communicate actuations and process sensations.
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Figure 3.3: Concrete HoneyPhy Architecture
In contrast to the abstract framework, there exists a front end and central repository
which contains all the necessary template and deployment information, backed by a database.
It also acts as the central point for the uploading of process, network, and device logs.
There is additionally a deployment controller which performs several functions. On
startup, it queries the front end to obtain the template and deployment information for its
specific system. The deployment controller is optionally responsible for checking for the
presence of deployment IPs in locations known to identify vulnerable CPS devices. Finally,
the deployment controller is responsible for collecting process, network, and device logs,




In order to prove the feasibility of both versions of HoneyPhy, two proof of concepts were
created.
4.1 Abstract HoneyPhy Proof of concept
In order to prove the feasibility of the Abstract HoneyPhy, a proof of concept was con-
structed, modeling a simple heating system. The process and devices included were mod-
eled.
4.1.1 Physical System Architecture
The simple heating system consists of an insulated and heated volume, a set of components
acting as a thermostat, and a set of components acting as a heater. The logical architecture
of this system is presented in Figure 4.1.
The thermostat analogue labeled in Figure 4.1 consists partially of a personal com-
puter executing temperature control logic based on the temperature read from a USB ther-
mometer located inside the heated area. If this temperature violates the programmed limit
set points, the PC sends a DNP3 command, using the OpenDNP3 library, to a connected
SEL-751A Relay to either turn the heater on or off. The SEL-751A Relay responds to
that command by closing or opening a physical relay (Potter and Brumfield (P&B) KUL-
11D15D-24), for which a black box model was previously obtained.
This physical relay, along with the ceramic heater bulb it controlled, formed our heater
analogue, as labeled in Figure 4.1.
While not implemented in the system, in a real Internet of Things (IoT) thermostat
the current temperature, heater status, and set points could be interrogated and controlled
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Figure 4.1: Process Modeled in Abstract Proof of Concept
through an external network interface of the PC.
4.1.2 Models and Simulation
In order to simulate this system, an analytic model was developed of how the enclosed
volume was heated by the heating element and was cooled by the environment. This was
based on empirical results gathered from the internal USB thermometer, and made up of
closed form equations, seen in Equations 4.1 and 4.2, where T bulb , T air and T env
represent the temperatures in degrees Celsius of the bulb, air, and environment respectively,
t indicates time, and S heater represents the state of the heater. As the model looped through
the simulation, the time between the last state update and the current state update are used
to calculate the update in observed temperature for both the internal heater and the air
temperature. The specific coefficients in the equations resulted from creating the general
form of the equations from Newtons Law of Cooling, then fitting the resulting equations




+ ∆t · [(HeaterState) · (0.00775 ·BulbTemperature1.04)
− 0.00084 · (BulbTemperature− AirTemperature)1.48775]
(4.1)
AirTemperature(◦C) = AirTemperature
+ ∆t · [0.00084 · (BulbTemperature− AirTemperature)1.085
− 0.00041 · (AirTemperature− EnvironmentTemperature)1.225]
(4.2)
The top of Figure 4.2 shows an observed heating/cooling curve from the physical sys-
tem, and a similar curve generated by the process model for the same control actions. This
curve occurs above room temperature, energizing the heater at the beginning of the data
set at 28.5 C and turning it off at the vertical read line. Assuming these control commands
originate from the attacker, if they energize the heater at t = 0s, at t = 500s they can com-
pare the reported temperature of the system against either their intuition of the system or a
separate process model they have created. Data points have been superimposed below the
real data to illustrate what Digital Bonds SCADA Honeynet and Gaspot would return when
asked for the air temperature, if used to simulate a similar system. This data was gener-
ated by inspecting relevant source, and observing the use of Python’s random.randint for
Gaspot, and finding only classes such as RandomDigitalIn and RandRangeInputRegister
when inspecting the Modbus simulator for Digital Bond’s SCADA Honeynet. This clearly
does not capture process behavior, and when the attacker checks the reported behavior of
the system at t = 500s, it will be clear that something is wrong.
To capture device behavior, previously developed black box models for the same relay
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Figure 4.2: Models Used in Abstract Proof of Concept
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were leveraged [27]. For the implemented device model, the black box data was randomly
sampled. A white box model was also previously developed for the same relay. The sim-
ulation is convincing with both models, as can be seen in the bottom of Figure 4.2, which
shows histograms of device operation times from both models. Both open and close distri-
butions for both models are shown, and dark regions show overlaps in the open and close
distributions. The black box model was generated by empirically observing the device,
while the white box was generated by simulating mechanical properties based on specifi-
cations. While the standard deviation of both distributions differs slightly due to simplifi-
cations made in the white box modeling, the means of both models are clearly similar. The
present differences should not be apparent to any shorter term attackers. Machine learning
tools in [27], trained using this white box model, successfully differentiated two models of
physical relays with 80% accuracy.
The modules used in implementing this proof of concept were all multithreaded and
written in Python, using standard system libraries. The system is capable of real-time
simulation, at a variety of time-step granularities.
4.2 Deployable Proof of Concept
In order to move HoneyPhy towards a system that researchers and production networks can
actually use, a proof of concept implementation for the Deployable HoneyPhy framework
was implemented.
4.2.1 Framework Elements Common to All Systems
The following portions of the framework were implemented in the proof of concept, and
are common to any system modeled within the framework.
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REST Framework Implementation
A simple centralized template configuration, deployment configuration, and log collec-
tion repository was created using the Django REST framework [37, 38] in Python 2.7.
This framework provided the means to store related configurations backed by a SQLite 3
database. With this, it was possible to only provide deployment controllers with the id of
a desired deployment, and the deployment controllers are capable of retrieving all related
configurations, and upload log collections tagged with the related deployment. The im-
plemented REST framework also optionally serves deployment controller source, and the
deployment controller is capable of polling the REST framework for ready deployments.
During testing, only a single bash script was required to retrieve and start a deployment.
While a web-based front end that enables remote inspection of logs would be the ul-
timate goal, for the proof of concept Django’s administration framework was sufficient to
manage deployment configurations, template configurations, and log collections. A screen-
shot of the administration page for editing a deployment configuration record can be seen
in Figure 4.3.
General Implemented Deployment Structure
An overview of how the deployable HoneyPhy proof of concept was implemented can be
seen in Figure 4.4. All device and process models run on the same physical hardware, but
run within docker containers. Every device has a central device controller. For every ser-
vice a device implements, a separate thread is run, which is connected to the central device
controller via Python Multiprocessing Pipes. The process model in this framework is just a
separate device, with a service that implements the math necessary to model process evo-
lution. Devices communicate among themselves over UDP through an internal network,
which is implemented as a Docker bridge network. These device services are optionally
connected to an external network, which is also implemented as a Docker bridge network
and exposed through the physical network interfaces of the deployment machine. A con-
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Figure 4.3: Screenshot of Django Administration Site
tainer running Snort captures traffic from this external network to get a complete record of
the network interactions that occur within the system.
More detail information on the individual components identified here is given below.
Deployment Controller Implementation
The deployment controller for the deployable HoneyPhy framework was implemented in
Python 2.7. Upon startup, the system polls the REST framework for deployments that
have not been deployed yet, and claims the deployment with the earliest activation time.
Once it receives confirmation that the deployment is claimed, it downloads the necessary
configuration zip files, and begins readying for activation.
Once the activation time of the deployment passes, the deployment controller begins
spinning up the deployment. In this framework, each device is implemented in a Docker
Container [39], which, when combined with the Python Docker API [40] eases deployment.
Each device shares the same base docker image, and device specific configuration and
services are mounted as a volume. Additionally, network monitoring and alert generation
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Figure 4.4: Overview of the Deployment System
is accomplished through the use of Snort [41], which is also run within a docker container.
The first thing the deployment controller does, then, is build the device docker image and
the Snort docker image and container.
The deployment controller creates the internal and external networks as Docker Bridge
networks. In [42] it is shown that Docker bridge networks are slower than native bare-metal
networking, but should still be insignificant in comparison to other networking delays.
The deployment controller then parses the template configuration file and deployment
configuration file, and creates individual device docker containers. Template configura-
tion files will always specify an interface a device uses to communicate over the internal
network, so devices are connected to the internal network when created. Deployment con-
figuration files can possibly specify an interface devices host a service on, and if so, the
device is connected to the external network as well. Device configuration is passed as an
environment variable to the Docker container.
The deployment controller then actually starts the devices and the Snort container. At a
tunable interval, the deployment controller gathers all the generated logs, compresses them,
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and uploads the collection to the rest framework. In the same interval, the deployment
controller polls Shodan [8] for the information Shodan has collected on the devices in the
deployment. If the controller notices that the current time is after the scheduled end of
the deployment, the controller terminates all devices and uploads a final compressed log
collection.
Device Controller Implementation
The device controller implements much of the functionality common across any device
model. It is passed configuration information through an environment variable in its host
Docker container, and any necessary static files are mounted as a volume in the container.
Initially, the device controller parses its configuration information into local data struc-
tures.
These first of these data structures specifies information related to the process variables
the controlled device ‘originates’ or requires. For example, a device model implementing
a valve ‘originates’ the status of the valve, and a device model which implements process
evolution likely requires the status of the valve. Additionally, devices note which variables
their services are dependent on, and which remote devices originate those variables.
Another data structure is the list of services the controlled device implements. The de-
vice configuration includes service names, python modules that implement those services,
and interfaces those services expose to the external network. Once the data structure is
filled, a Python Multiprocessing process is created for each service.
Once all preparation is complete, all the service processes are started, and the device
controller begins processing communications originating both on the docker container’s
internal network interface, as well as the various pipes connected to the device’s services.
Some of these communications involve the device controller sampling specified process
variables from remote devices.
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Generic Service Implementation
In order to agree with how the device controller initializes and starts services, there are sev-
eral requirements for all implemented services. They must be implemented in a class called
Service, which implements the method start service. A generic service class
is provided which other services can inherit from, which implements common functionality
for other services.
Deployment Timeline Example
In order to more clearly illustrate how the deployment controller activates a deployment,
and example is provided in Figure 4.5. First, the deployment controller gets a list of sys-
tems ready to be deployed from the REST framework (1), and downloads the configuration
files for one of the systems (2). Then, when the deployment’s activation time is reached, the
controller creates the device container image and Snort container image (3). The deploy-
ment controller creates the internal and external networks (4), and finally creates and starts
all the devices specified in the system’s configuration (5). Once all necessary components
are started and the system begins its’ simulation, logs are periodically collected and sent to
the central server (6).
Network Traffic Capture
In order to capture all network traffic that occurs over the external network, and attempt
to identify intrusions by their network fingerprint alone, the Snort system is run within a
docker container in two of its modes. First, Snort is run in its packet logging mode to cap-
ture all observable traffic. This process is started and killed over a tunable interval, but for
the proof of concept this was around 5 minutes. There are interesting problems surrounding
the tuning of this capture interval, including intrusions that span multiple capture intervals
and the delay between intrusion and alert generation, but they are beyond the scope of this
proof of concept.
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Figure 4.5: Example of a Deployment’s Timeline
Once a capture interval has elapsed, and the capture file is closed, the captured traffic
is analyzed through Snort’s retroactive intrusion detection mode. The Snort rules used in
this proof of concept were the default Snort ruleset, which does require an account. The
rules contain several entries corresponding to CPS specific exploits, but also are capable of
identifying a large amount of other intrusion activity. Once finished, this intrusion detection
analysis outputs a list of alerts, as well as a smaller packet capture containing only the traffic
that generated those alerts.
In order to test the successful network capture and subsequent identification of exploits
included in the configured Snort rules, a Metasploit [43] deployment was used to generate
an attack to stop a PLC CPU. The offending packets were correctly identified in the snort
logs, as seen in Figure 4.6 and a smaller packet capture was created containing only the
offending packets 4.7. Note that the times (as recorded in UTC) agree between logs and
the packet capture, and that a full packet capture containing the context for the offending
packet is also stored.
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Figure 4.6: Exploit Identified by Snort Logs
Figure 4.7: Concise Exploit Packet Capture Displayed in Wireshark
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Specification for Configuration Files
Multiple configuration files were required to implement the proof of concept. All con-
figuration information is stored as JSON files, while all device specific functionality was
implemented as python modules.
The first configuration file, which stores information related to the system being mod-
eled, is called the ‘template configuration’. This specified the IP space for the internal
network, and enumerates the devices that make up the modeled system. For each device,
some meta-data is included, an internal interface and the path to device service modules
are specified, and several lists are included. These lists consist of the list of services that
device presents, the system variables that device uses, and what other device models that
device communicates with.
The second configuration file separates the deployment specific information from the
template configuration. This is a much shorter file, and only specifies the IP space of the
external network and any external interfaces individual device models might present.
Device service modules are stored in separate directories, and for local deployments
device logs are stored in these directories as well.
4.2.2 Framework Elements Specific to the Implemented System Model
The following pieces of the framework deal with implementing the specific system model
for this proof of concept.
Modeled System
In order to create an implementation of the framework, it was necessary to select and model
a simple system. There exist relatively simple CPS, but system owners are understandably
wary of sharing information. To implement the proof of concept then, a simplified version
of the water treatment subsystem model used in [21] was reimplemented. The system is
elaborated upon in the tutorial offered for their referenced capture the flag [44], and source
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code for the example is open sourced at [45]. The source code for the example was analyzed
to obtain models for the process and device logic, but no code was reused.
The system architecture can be seen in Figure 4.8. The portion that was modeled con-
sists of tank storage of input water, tank storage of water for ultra-filtration, and the valves
and pumps that regulate the different levels in the tanks. In Figure 4.8, input water enters
from the left, and the inlet to the Raw Water Storage tank is controlled by Valve 1 and
monitored by Flow Meter 1. The water in the storage tank is then pumped through Pump
1, monitored by Flow Meter 2, into the Ultra-Filtration Tank, depending on the tank levels.
The physical devices are monitored and controlled by 3 PLCs, labeled in Figure 4.8
as PLC 1, PLC 2, and PLC 3. PLC 1 is responsible for controlling Valve 1 and Pump 1,
measuring Flow Meter 1, and measuring the level of the Raw Water Storage tank. PLC 2 is
responsible for measuring Flow Meter 2. PLC 3 is responsible for measuring the level of
the Ultra-Filtration tank.
All PLCs communicate as necessary over the common CPS protocol Ethernet/IP. Specif-
ically, PLC 1 executes logic dependent on the flow observed by Flow Meter 2 and the level
of the Ultra-Filtration tank, and so queries PLC 2 and PLC 3 for their measured values.
There is additionally a simple HMI which displays the measured values for the Raw
Water Storage tank level, as well as the activation status of Valve 1 and Pump 1. This
HMI obtains these values by querying PLC 1 over Ethernet/IP. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show
examples of this HMI.
Process Implementation
The first native python implementation of the process was done using an extension of a
generic device. A generic process service was created, such that the only methods that
a user needs to implement is an update state method, which should update process
state based on a given update rate, and a deal with violations method, which
defines how a process should deal with cases where physical boundaries are breached. For
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Figure 4.8: Architecture of the Modeled System
this specific system, the process model was reimplemented from the example system, and
consisted of updating tank levels by calculating the volume change of fluid in the tanks
based on flow rates into and out of the tanks. An example of process behavior as seen
through the implemented HMI is seen in Figure 4.9. In this particular figure, the level
of the raw storage tank is seen to exceed a threshold, and this triggers PLC1 to close the
input valve. Consequently, water continues to drain from the raw storage tank into the
ultra-filtration tank, but is not replaced by the input flow.
To illustrate the degree to which framework support eased the reimplementation of the
process model, the full native python implementation is included in Appendix A.
External Implementation
In order to prove the feasibility of substituting external process models, a separate process
model was implemented using Matlab. This external process model used a naive communi-
cation scheme over local TCP with a simple service, which translated between the Matlab
communications and the internal interface communications. The same pattern would allow
the use of more common pieces of modeling software, such as LabView [46]. The exter-
nal process model exhibited similar behavior to Figure 4.9, as seen in Figure 4.10. In this
41
Figure 4.9: HMI View of Native Python Process Model
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Figure 4.10: HMI View of External Matlab Process Model
particular figure, the process is seen at an early stage, where all valves are open and pumps
are on, and the raw storage tank is seen slowly filling. Of note is the fact that no imple-
mentation details other than the process model changed, aside from tweaking the number
of measurements displayed.
Device Logic Implementations
PLC 1 was required to make decisions based on observed process parameters. Specifically,
it opened/closed Valve 1 based on the level of water in the Raw Water Storage tank, and
turned on/off Pump 1 based on the level of water in the Ultra-Filtration tank. This was im-
plemented as a service which requested the process parameters, implemented the logic, and
issued actuations as necessary. The flow read by Flow Meter 2 and the level of the Ultra-
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Filtration tank were read by PLC 2 and PLC 3 respectively, so the Ethernet/IP Services
presented by PLCs 1, 2, and 3 were used to enable PLC 1 to read those process variables.
Ethernet/IP Service
All PLCs needed to create and respond to Ethernet/IP traffic. In order to support this, a
simple service was implemented to interface with the Python Ethernet/IP server module,
CPPPO. Similarly, the HMI was required to read values from PLC 1’s Ethernet/IP server,
in order to present them to the user, and leverage the same module.
The models implemented for all PLCs are generic, and have no specific target devices.
However, there exist several published attacks for common PLC vendors. These exploits
are included in the default Metasploit [43] install, and a single simple exploit which stops
the PLC CPU was emulated in PLC 3. For this specific exploit, the only observable effect
to an external attacker would be cessation of all Ethernet/IP traffic. The exploit was suc-
cessfully emulated, and when exercised by Metasploit, resulted in a loss of communication
both between PLC 3 and external traffic and PLC 3 and other PLCs.
Naive Device Model
In order to implement the actuation devices of Valve 1 and Pump 1, a simple naive device
model was first implemented. In this model, when an actuation device receives an actuation
from PLC 1, the process model is immediately updated. This is the simplest realizable
model, and can be used as a placeholder until more realistic device models are generated,
either through direct observation of the physical device or though white box modeling. This
model was used for both the native python process implementation and for the external
Matlab process implementation, shown in Figures 4.9 and 4.10 respectively.
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Delaying Device Model
In implementing this system, no device models were available. In order to prove the fea-
sibility of leveraging such a model though, a device model for Valve 1 was created that
introduced a delay to account for the time required for the valve to actuate. In [27], a
device model for a relay was developed, and showed that the actuation time distribution
was roughly normal. Accordingly, this delay was normally distributed with a mean of 4
seconds and a standard deviation of 0.25 seconds. The effect of this delay can be seen in
the highlighted sections of Figure 4.11. This screenshot was taken shortly after the Raw
Storage tank level (L101 Level in the figure) exceeded the threshold for closing Valve 1
(MV101 in the figure). The green highlighted time slice shows when the tank level ex-
ceeds the threshold (799 mm), and the desired status drops to closed shortly after. The blue
highlighted time slice shows when the tank level actually begins dropping, which occurs
roughly 4 seconds after the threshold is exceeded, as seen by the timestamps below.
HMI Service
The HMI model implemented in the system was required to serve a website presenting a
simple visualization of process behavior. In the modeled system, this visualization was an
image which refreshed once a second. In order to accomplish this, two additional services
were implemented. One service was supplied with the relevant data from the Ethernet/IP
service used in the HMI, and implemented the same data graphing process as the the mod-
eled system, where the most recent set of measurements is displayed for the Raw Water
Storage level, Valve 1 on/off status, and Pump 1 on/off status. The other service presented
a simple HTTP server, implemented in the Flask Python library. Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11
show examples of the visualization.
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Figure 4.11: Example of Actuation Delay Introduced by Device Model
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4.3 Limitations
The proof of concept implementation presented here succeeds in creating a framework
capable of simulating a complete system, but still has several recognized limitations.
4.3.1 Simulation Speed
The proof of concept developed here modeled a somewhat slow process, but for systems
with faster control loops and faster process evolution, faster implementations will have to
be developed. Specifically, the use of the interpreted language Python allowed for ease
of development, but is slower than other compiled languages which could potentially be
used to model very fast, complicated systems. For the deployable system proof of concept
as well, the CPPPO library proved to be a workable, but very slow means of exposing
an Ethernet/IP service, and other methods of providing that service would be required for
faster systems.
4.3.2 Exploit Emulation
In this thesis, the proof of concept framework was able to emulate a simple DOS exploit
for a PLC. However, there exist other, more nuanced exploits of CPS computing devices,
and some devices are capable of being reprogrammed by attackers due to poor authentica-
tion. An example of leveraging nuanced exploits and PLC reprogramming to implement
PLC ransomware is presented in [47]. Emulating these kinds of exploits and reprogram-
ming events is likely not possible using only virtualized devices in the current framework,
without implementing a more abstract representation for internal device logic and behavior.
Potential solutions include utilizing real devices or locally interpreting the programs run by
PLCs, and are discussed in the Future Work section of Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, the design of a new kind of honeypot for CPS is presented.
An initial design is proposed, detailing how various process and device models should
interact. Subsequently, a refined design is proposed, detailing a means for easily integrating
new models, easily deploying honeypot instances, and centrally collecting logs from a
number of honeypot instances.
Two proof of concepts for these designs are implemented. The process of develop-
ing process and device models are documented, and the resulting system simulations are
presented. The limitations of the refined proof of concept are identified.
5.2 Future Work
While for this thesis, the goal of producing a proof of concept for a deployable CPS honey-
pot within the HoneyPhy framework was achieved, there exists several promising avenues
that would speed and ease adoption in both research and production environments.
5.2.1 Creating High-Interaction Computing Device Models
Some device models developed for this proof of concept exposed services to the external
network. Any exposed network service will necessarily need to reflect the network finger-
print of the device it aims to model, and respond to all communication in a realistic way.
This can be accomplished through careful emulation, but the simplest means to accomplish
this is to connect the actual device. This would, in effect, create a high-interaction device
model, which perfectly reflects the device’s fingerprint and responses.
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In order to integrate this with the current framework, a service will need to be created
that interprets signals emitted from the portion of the device that interacts with the physical
process, sends actuation events accordingly, and responds with realistic sensor data. The
network interface of the device that is exposed to the Internet will also need to be connected
to the external network, to allow for potential network communication to other devices.
Furthermore, and this is the difficulty many high-interaction honeypots face, some
mechanism for observing and logging device level events must be implemented. With-
out this, the device becomes a black-box with respect to the rest of the honeypot. This
can still be useful to check for attackers capable of causing damage, but does not reveal as
much information about attacker methods.
5.2.2 Emulating Reprogramming Events in Low-Interaction Computing Device Models
If high-interaction device models still prove impractical, it is desirable to be still able to
emulate nuanced exploits and reprogramming events. A common case of impractical de-
vice models will likely be PLCs, where real-time operating systems render virtualization
difficult. PLCs do, however, implement their logic using a regular programming language,
which is rendered into a binary, and run on a very regular control loop, called a scan cycle.
The possibility of emulating the underlying scan cycle architecture and having device
models locally interpret PLC binaries might provide the means to create low-interaction
device models capable of emulating reprogramming events.
5.2.3 Automated Intelligence Analysis
With the centrally collected network, process, and device logs provided by a convincing
CPS honeypot, the capability and intent of attackers can be assessed in a fine-grained man-
ner. This includes labeling traditional cyber capability, but also an attacker’s capability to
interact with a process and move it into a dangerous state. Given this new information,
attacker interactions can broadly be classified in the following ways:
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• Low level reconnaissance: Attacker conducts reconnaissance actions, which betray
unauthorized network access, but do not indicate the attacker is in any way aware
that the system is related to critical infrastructure. This behavior can come from a
variety of sources, depending on external network access.
• Misattributed exploits: Attacker runs exploits, but those exploits are not intended
for the modeled devices. This indicates the attacker is unaware of the nature of the
modeled system, but has the capability to exploit whatever devices the vulnerability
effects.
• General CPS Capability: Attacker conducts reconnaissance actions that indicate fa-
miliarity with CPS systems in general, but not the modeled system specifically. This
can consist of reading Modbus Tags, Ethernet/IP Device ID information, etc.
• Specific System Capability, but no current malicious intent: The attacker interacts
with the system in a way that indicates familiarity with the specific system, but does
not indicate any intent to cause harm in any way. This can consist of the first action
taken by an unknown host being modifying a state variable, set point, or device status.
This indicates severe compromise.
• Specific System Capability and Malicious Intent: The attacker interacts with the
system in a way that, were the system real, could cause damage to the system or to the
system’s operators. This indicates extreme attacker capability as well as malicious
intent.
In the future, an automated system could be created to process all collected logs and
label interactions in this way. This could be useful in a production environment if the result-
ing labels are checked periodically by system users or security experts, or if the automated
assessments send alerts to an organization’s SOC. This will also ease the manual forensics
of intrusions in a research context.
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5.2.4 Real-time Switching for Intrusion Prevention
There exist some systems, such as [48, 49], which are capable of real time dynamic sim-
ulation of complicated CPS. It could be feasible to have these systems integrated into the
HoneyPhy framework, and provide their traditional value, but also have the opportunity to
identify malicious behaviors and switch to entirely simulated device models.
Such a system would provide the traditional benefits of a production honeypot, but also
include convincing enough device models to capture more sophisticated attacker activities
for research purposes. In addition, the utilization of the default process model to provide
additional and ancillary value to actual system operations could ease adoption among some
sectors.
This would require tight coupling with the system owners, as there is always the po-
tential to misidentify legitimate commands as malicious, and block normal operations. Ul-
timately the feasibility of utilizing a honeypot in-line with an intrusion prevention system
should be explored.
5.2.5 Reimplementing To Optimize for Speed
As mentioned above, in order to model systems with fast control loops and high-frequency
processes, faster models and services must be developed. This would primarily involve
reimplementing the Device Controller and individual services. As the Deployment Con-
troller and the REST Framework have no effect on the speed of individual devices, there
would be no need to reimplement them. A compiled language such as c could be used to
provide an immediate increase in speed compared to Python. Additionally, a faster method
of interprocess communication could be investigated to replace the Multiprocessing Pipes
used, as well as the internal interface network.
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5.2.6 Full Scale Deployment
While the proof of concepts illustrated the feasibility of creating a convincing CPS hon-
eypot, a full scale deployment would further prove the usefulness of the framework. This
would require significant industry collaboration, as device and process models would need
to be developed for the specific system to be modeled. Furthermore, industry IP addresses









4 import src.interfaces.process_interface as process_interface
5
6 # Define some constants
7 TANK_DIAMETER = 1.38 # In m
8 TANK_RADIUS = TANK_DIAMETER/2 # In m
9 PUMP_FLOWRATE_IN = 2.55 # In mˆ3/h
10 PUMP_FLOWRATE_OUT = 2.45 # In mˆ3/h
11
12 # Define tank set points in mm




















32 def __init__(self, **kwargs):
33
34 # specify device_config.json vars, and assign ’zero’ vals to
them
35
36 self.log_name = ’service_swat_process’
37
38 self.internal_vals[’l101’] = 0.0
39 self.internal_vals[’l301’] = 0.0
40 self.internal_vals[’f101’] = 0.0
41 self.internal_vals[’f201’] = 0.0
42 self.internal_vals[’p101_real’] = False
43 self.internal_vals[’mv101_real’] = False
44
45 # Define the update frequency
46 self.update_period = .2 # 200 ms
47
48 # Define ancillary conversion values
49 self.lvl2vol = math.pi * math.pow(TANK_RADIUS, 2)
50 self.vol2lvl = 1.0 / (math.pi * math.pow(TANK_RADIUS, 2))






57 # Update flowrates based on valve status
58 if self.internal_vals[’mv101_real’]:
59 self.internal_vals[’f101’] = PUMP_FLOWRATE_IN
55
60 else:
61 self.internal_vals[’f101’] = 0.0
62
63 if self.internal_vals[’p101_real’]:
64 self.internal_vals[’f201’] = PUMP_FLOWRATE_OUT
65 else:
66 self.internal_vals[’f201’] = 0.0
67
68 # Update the tank levels based on their inputs
69
70 # Get current volumes
71 cur_lvl_101 = self.internal_vals[’l101’] # l101 contains tank
level in mm
72 cur_lvl_101 = cur_lvl_101 / 1000.0 # get level in m
73
74 cur_vol_101 = cur_lvl_101 * self.lvl2vol
75
76 cur_lvl_301 = self.internal_vals[’l301’]
77 cur_lvl_301 = cur_lvl_301 / 1000.0
78
79 cur_vol_301 = cur_lvl_301 * self.lvl2vol
80
81 # Account for inflow rate
82 cur_vol_101 += self.internal_vals[’f101’] * self.flow2vol
83 cur_vol_301 += self.internal_vals[’f201’] * self.flow2vol
84
85 # Account for outflow rate
86 cur_vol_101 -= self.internal_vals[’f201’] * self.flow2vol
87 # Tank 301 doesn’t currently have outputs
88
89 # Write to kv-store, and reconvert to mm
90 self.internal_vals[’l101’] = cur_vol_101 * self.vol2lvl * 1000
91 self.internal_vals[’l301’] = cur_vol_301 * self.vol2lvl * 1000
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92
93 def deal_with_violations(self, violations_list):
94 pass
95
96 def start_service(self, interface_dict=None, pipe=None, varlist=None
):
97
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